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Abstract 
The emergence of peer-to-peer platforms, known as the sharing economy, has 
empowered people to market their own products and services. However, there are 
information asymmetries that make it difficult to evaluate the reputation of the seller 
a priori. This paper examines how sellers have to enhance their personal reputation in 
order to optimize revenues. The study proposes a revenue model where, given a 
frontier that depends on the shared assets, the maximization of revenues depends on 
reputational factors of the person and of the product. An empirical validation of the 
framework has been conducted in the context of Airbnb, a popular sharing economy 
travel platform. The sample comprises 981 establishments across 5 European cities. 
The findings suggest the crucial importance of personal reputation along with some 
distinctive reputational attributes of the product itself. These results emphasize the 
role of trust and personal branding strategies in peer-to-peer platforms. 
Keywords: Airbnb; personal reputation; revenue optimization; resource-based view; 
stochastic frontier; sharing economy 
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Introduction 
Online peer-to-peer (P2P) marketplaces have become widely common due to 
technological advances and economic and societal considerations (Tussyadiah and 
Pesonen 2016). Some are specialized in a single business. Others offer a differentiated 
range of goods and services. These marketplaces involve consumers who transact 
directly with other individuals (sellers) while the marketplace platform itself is 
provided by a third party. This realm is commonly labelled as the sharing economy, 
and it mainly concerns the supply of services. A driving force of its success is the 
increased consumer need for personal interactions (Guttentag 2015; Guttentag et al 
2017). Summarizing the DNA of this market, the co-founder of Airbnb defines the 
sharing economy as “commerce with a promise of human connection” (Gebbia 2016).  
Philosophically and conceptually, sharing economy revolves around the idea of gift 
giving (Belk 2007), with past research investigating the psychological motivations for 
sharing (Bardhi and Eckhardt 2012; Lamberton and Rose 2012). In recent times, these 
boundaries have been extended and now sharing is mainly a market mode in the hand 
of few providers (Kennedy 2016; Heo 2016). The service sector assisted the rapid 
growth of these providers in the last decade. Operators such as Airbnb, BlaBlaCar, 
and HomeAway pose new threats to the traditional hospitality and travel industry. In 
Europe, due to the scarce regulation of this new industry, there have been some legal 
challenges among governments, traditional operators, and other stakeholders (Dredge 
2017).  
Ordinary people see the emerging business opportunity and act as hosts by renting out 
their car spaces, rooms, or entire flats. Through P2P platforms, consumers turn 
themselves into ‘micro-entrepreneurs’ supplying their existing assets and services to 
other people (Sundararajan, 2016). Interestingly, very similar assets present 
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substantially different performance data (Wang and Nicolau 2017), but little empirical 
research has explored the drivers to maximize performance. Sharing platforms display 
personal reputation indicators, such as sellers’ identification data and credentials 
related to functions they perform. Given that information, we portray that the success 
of products in sharing economy marketplaces is greatly influenced by the personal 
reputation of the seller. Personal reputation reduces the level of uncertainty in the 
transaction and increases the quality of the relationship between all the parties 
involved (Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002). Specifically, Mathies, Siegfried and Wang 
(2013) advocate for studies to understand the interplay between customer-centric 
marketing and revenue management.  
To date, there is limited information on the magnitude of personal reputation with 
respect to product reputation. At the same time, it is important to rule out all the 
possible alternative explanations for different revenue performance, such as a 
differentiation in the specific attributes or services.  
This work focuses on the question of performance optimization in the sharing 
economy, a context where, de facto, ordinary people and consumers act as micro-
entrepreneurs. In particular, the goal of this paper is to unclose the impact of product 
and personal reputation on revenue optimization in the sharing economy. From a 
methodological standpoint, the stochastic frontier approach helps to model this 
setting. More specifically, reputational elements are seen, coherently with resource-
based view literature (Dutta et al. 1999; Nath et al. 2010), as the marketing capability 
that explains whether the seller is close to the level of revenue frontier. 
The reminder of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the theoretical 
framework. The level of achieved revenues, which stems from the value of the shared 
assets, is shaped by product and personal reputation. An empirical case, assessed 
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through a revenue frontier model, validates the proposed model in the context of 
Airbnb, a popular sharing economy platform. After presenting the findings, the paper 
concludes with theoretical and practical implications on personal reputation’s ability 
to reduce revenue inefficiency. 
 
Theoretical framework 
Performance benchmarking in the sharing economy 
Frontier studies are a popular method to measure tourism performance (Assaf et al. 
2017). The underlying idea of these models is that a set of inputs leads to a potential 
maximum level of output (i.e., the frontier). With respect to other approaches, “the 
distinctive feature of the frontier methods for performance measurement is that they 
provide a measure of efficiency that reveals gaps between a firm’s actual and optimal 
performance” (Assaf and Josiassen 2016, p. 613). In their detailed review, Assaf and 
Josiassen (2016) empirically classify extant tourism frontier literature according to the 
adopted empirical method (parametric or non-parametric). The majority of these 
studies focus on the hotel industry, as confirmed also by Sellers-Rubio & Nicolau-
Gonzálbez (2009). In general, this methodological framework is widely used to 
compare different types of firms’ performances - productive efficiency, cost 
efficiency, revenue efficiency or profit efficiency - and to identify the determinants of 
inefficiencies (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2003). 
In a resource-based view of the firm (Wernerfelt 1984; Dutta et al. 1999), marketing 
capabilities are seen as the ability to deploy the available resources to achieve the 
desired output (Nath et al. 2010). When focusing on revenue performances, the 
available firm resources represent the inputs. Deviation from the maximum attainable 
output (i.e., inefficiency) can be explained by the marketing capability of the firm. In 
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this sense, Trainor (2012) explains that the available resources should be treated 
separately from capabilities. 
Marketing capability is widely operationalized with reputational factors, such as the 
years of experience in the market (Sellers and Mas 2006; Assaf et al. 2011), brand 
image (Morgan et al. 2011), the presence and quality of visual shared content (Trainor 
2012), and third-party or consumer quality scores (Stuebs and Sun 2010). 
Theoretically, Kreps et al. (1982) initially conceptualized reputation as a process 
where parties continually update their beliefs based on past interactions. It follows 
that reputation is likely to have an impact on the seller’s effectiveness, as it reduces 
the uncertainty regarding the transaction (Luca 2011).  
Given that in the sharing economy individual performance differs quite substantially 
across sellers even when assets are very similar (Wang and Nicolau 2017), the 
frontier method is useful to compare the behavior (and performance) of subjects 
sharing their assets in a peer-to-peer platform. In this context, the assets shared by the 
individual can be viewed as the input. The characteristics of a rented apartment in 
Airbnb are an example of this. As presented in Figure 1, starting from the shared 
assets (the inputs), the frontier model measures the gap between achieved and 
maximum potential revenues at the individual level. Embracing the marketing 
capability approach, reputation factors explain this discrepancy. In particular, the 
proposed model includes two distinct types of reputation, i.e. product and personal 
reputation, as the mechanisms that explain the individual deviation from the frontier 
level.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
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Shared assets 
Shared assets in the form of the product’s physical and service characteristics 
represent the basic sharing economy input on commanding a revenue level. In 
traditional markets, previous literature suggests a clear link between product 
characteristics and business performance (Phillips et al. 1983; Sashi and Stern 1995; 
Zhu and Zhang 2010). The same applies to peer-to peer markets although, on average, 
these markets are characterized by less services and amenities when compared to 
traditional markets (Zervas and Proserpio 2016).  
In the travel industry, the physical attributes comprise all characteristics of the 
accommodation, such as the location and the type of accommodation being offered 
(Monty and Skidmore 2003; Zhang et al. 2011; Viglia and Abrate 2017). On the other 
hand, the service attributes comprise all the different amenities offered at the 
accommodation, such as conditioning services and technological facilities (Abrate et 
al. 2011; de Oliveira Santos 2016).  
 
Product reputation 
A meta-analysis conducted by Floyd et al. (2014) finds that product reputation exerts 
a significant effect on revenues. This result holds across a variety of contexts and is 
consistent across geographical areas, types of products and different methodological 
approaches.  
Previous research agrees that consumers consult online reviews to form their ideas on 
the reputation of the product (Sparks and Browning 2011; Yacouel and Fleischer 
2012; Filieri and McLeay 2014). Generally, literature investigating the impacts of 
product reviews on choices, intentions, and sales is quite vast (e.g., Chevalier and 
Mayzlin 2006; Sen and Lerman 2007; Lee and Youn 2009; Tirunillai and Tellis 
2012). Online product reviews can be considered in multiple quantitative dimensions, 
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such as review valence, volume and variance, and in multiple qualitative dimensions, 
such as the presence of product pictures and the correct and complete information on 
the product being offered (Trainor 2012).  
A majority of academic attention is focused on the online reviews’ impact on demand 
and revenues. For the customer review website Yelp.com, Luca (2011) tests the 
impact of consumer reviews on sales and finds that the impact is stronger if the 
operator is an individual seller rather than to a franchise. This suggests that the higher 
the uncertainty regarding the transaction, the higher the weight is attributed to online 
reviews. In addition, Cabral and Hortacsu (2010) find that a single negative review on 
eBay has a significant negative impact on the seller’s overall growth rate. Nonetheless 
there are contrasting findings on the relevance of online reviews. For instance, Liu 
(2006) found that reviews matter per se as they increase the awareness of a product 
while Chintagunta et al. (2010) found that high quality reviews have no direct impact 
on sales.  
Some of these contrasting results depend on the methodological approach used to test 
for such an impact and the way the relationship between product reputation and 
revenues is modelled (Sellers-Rubio & Nicolau-Gonzálbez 2009; Cabral and Hortacsu 
2010). There is also disagreement on the role of the specific reputational elements. 
While some researchers (Ho-Dac Carson and Moore 2013; Xiong and Bharadwaj 
2014) find evidence that the volume of reviews (i.e., number of reviews) predict 
product sales, others claim that the main predictor of sales is rather the valence (i.e., 
review score) (Dellarocas et al. 2007; Chintagunta et al. 2010). A confounding 
element in this domain lies in the use of a composite valence-volume variable (e.g., 
the total number of 5-star ratings), which hinders the ability to untangle the specific 
impact of these review dimensions (Babić et al. 2016). 
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Online reviews not only influence consumer behaviour but are also the outcome of 
consumer purchases (Duan et al. 2008), and thus raise endogeneity concerns in 
empirical analyses. The application of the stochastic frontier model offers the 
flexibility to consider reputation separately as a marketing capability associated with a 
reduction of inefficiency (Stuebs and Sun 2010).  
Despite some methodological and operational challenges, the above literature 
converges in considering product reputation as salient in the case of services, where 
quality is difficult to assess prior to consumption. In sum, we portray that: 
 
H1: When benchmarking individual revenue performance in the sharing economy, 
product reputation reduces the gap between potential and achieved revenues 
 
Personal reputation 
Reputation goes beyond product reputation. You, Vadakkepatt and Joshi (2015) 
extend these boundaries by including several sources of personal reputation, such as 
the expertise of the seller. This aspect is salient in electronic markets, where 
consumers cannot always examine the source credibility a priori (Huang et al. 2012; 
Agag and El-Masry 2016). In sharing platforms, reputation systems are similar to the 
recommendation systems used, for example, by Yelp or TripAdvisor. However, 
instead of rating just products or services, participants have also the opportunity to 
analyse and rate the personal characteristics of the seller. Profile characteristics are 
the main source of personal reputation. Simply reporting basic attributes such as sex, 
ethnicity, and age is not sufficient, as the globally oriented marketplace attempts to 
attract customers from diverse and potentially worldwide backgrounds. In traditional 
businesses, corporate reputation is key (Roberts and Dowling 2002). Parties operating 
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in sharing economy platforms are incentivized to use reputation-signaling 
mechanisms to maximize the likelihood of a successful transaction. In addition, 
sharing economy environments are characterized by higher levels of social 
interactions compared to traditional markets (Tussyadiah 2016a; Tussyadiah and 
Pesonen 2016). Therefore, it is essential to provide fine-grained knowledge to reduce 
information asymmetries. 
Recently, some factors were shown to play a large role in personal reputation building 
on sharing economy platforms. These include the full identification of the seller 
(Edelman and Luca 2014), the seller’s personal photo (Ert et al. 2016), and the 
experience of the seller, measured through the time the seller is present on the 
platform (Pera et al. 2016). 
An active seller with high reputation may see an increase in his or her revenues 
because of a higher status within the online community. Belk (2014) suggests that 
personal information disclosure is key in collaborative consumption contexts. 
Therefore, personal reputation serves as the digital institution that reduces uncertainty 
and favours the likelihood of the transaction. More formally, 
 
H2: When benchmarking individual revenue performance in the sharing economy, 
personal reputation reduces the gap between potential and achieved revenues 
 
Personal reputation makes transactions between strangers safer and less uncertain 
(Belk 2014; Masum et al. 2011). This is even more relevant in the sharing economy, 
where the person who provides the service becomes an integral part of the experience 
(Ert el al. 2016). Given this, we portray that personal reputation is critical in ensuring 
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the provision of the product and its impact goes beyond the reputational elements of 
the product itself. In sum, 
 
H3: Compared to product reputation, personal reputation has a stronger weight in 
reducing the gap between potential and achieved revenues 
 
Methodology 
Context 
Airbnb.com is a popular online marketplace for short-term rentals. It presents more 
than one million listings spread across 34.000 cities and 190 countries (Sawatzky 
2015). 
The website resembles traditional accommodation booking websites. To book a room 
or an entire flat, the guest uses Airbnb request and payment system. Once the guest 
submits a query, Airbnb presents the guests’ request to the host who accepts or 
rejects. If the host accepts, Airbnb charges the guest and pays the host accordingly. In 
addition to traditional hospitality services that focus on the characteristics and reviews 
of the product, Airbnb facilitates an immediate access to the profile characteristics of 
the sellers.  
Airbnb earns its revenue by charging guests a 6-12% fee and hosts a 3% fee and 
competes in the market at different levels. The platform offers a service that sits 
generally in the middle compared with the two main groups of competitors. On the 
one side, there are hotels and upscale listing properties, such as Onefinestay 
(Guttentag 2015). On the other side, there are accommodation platforms where hosts 
offer to share a space completely free of charge. One of the largest of these networks 
that received recently academic attention (Rosen et al. 2011; Pera et al. 2016) is 
Couchsurfing.  
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In areas where Airbnb is most popular, hotels have lost about 10% of revenues over 
the last five to six years (Zervas and Proserpio 2016). 
 
The empirical model 
This paper adopts a stochastic frontier approach to model the revenues and their 
determinants. Coherently with the conceptual model, the assets shared in Airbnb are 
the characteristics of the flat (or room) that are made available for booking. The 
underlying hypothesis is that the characteristics of the flat constrain the Airbnb host’s 
maximum achievable revenue. In particular, the potential revenues depend on location 
factors (e.g. the city where the listing is located), the type of listing (entire flat or 
shared room in a flat), the number of rooms, beds, bathrooms as well as the services 
offered to the guests. Given these assets (A), the host aims at maximizing the 
revenues; however, he or she might be more or less efficient in achieving this goal. 
Drawing from our theoretical underpinning, we claim that reputational variables (R) 
are the key factors that can explain revenue efficiency. In other words, the 
characteristics of the flat define a theoretical maximum level of revenues and 
represent the “revenue frontier.” A good reputation allows the host to perform better 
than others and be closer to the frontier. On the contrary, a bad reputation will result 
in a larger distance from the revenue frontier. 
The frontier regression model can be written as follows: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐴𝑖) + 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖        [1] 
 
The dependent variable is the amount of achieved revenues (REV), taken in log, vi is 
the random noise and ui is the inefficiency term, which is constrained to be non-
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negative (no one can perform better than the “frontier” level) and is distributed as a 
truncated normal N+(µi, σ2i). The value of µi is modeled as a function of the 
explanatory variables [2]. In the specific case, each reputational variable Rk influences 
the level of inefficiency through the parameter 𝛿𝑘. The underlying assumption is a 
negative relation between inefficiency and (good) reputation.   
 
𝜇𝑖 = ∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑘𝑘 𝛿𝑘         [2] 
 
Data 
The dataset includes observations from the Airbnb website concerning the 5 most 
popular European destinations according to the global destination cities index (GDCI 
2014): Barcelona, Istanbul, London, Paris and Rome. The collected rooms and flats 
listed on Airbnb are the ones within a 2-kilometers maximum distance from the ‘main 
touristic attraction,’ identified by consulting general tourism websites.1 The adopted 
sampling procedure is a multi-stage sampling, with the first stage being the selection 
of the investigated city and the second stage being the individual collection of Airbnb 
listings capped at 200 observations per city. 
For each Airbnb listing, it was possible to retrieve information on prices, room (or 
flat) availability, the characteristics of the room (or flat) and reputational attributes.  
The achieved revenues for a specific room/flat are not directly observable, though 
they can be obtained by multiplying the price of the listing per its average monthly 
occupancy. The latter was obtained by repeatedly checking the room (or flat) 
availability in the Airbnb website in the next 28 days. This method is in line with 
previous studies (Liu et al. 2014; Viglia et al. 2016) and replicates the average 
temporal separation between the booking date and the subsequent check-in.2 This 
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measure of occupancy is a proxy for the true number of nights effectively sold by the 
host; the listing might also appear as “not available” because the host does not rent it 
for that specific date. Nonetheless, official bookings, which are not available in the 
Airbnb platform, would also be a biased measure of the occupancy rate, since hosts 
might rent the listing outside the official Airbnb website, especially in the case of 
repeating guests (Forbes 2010). Occupancy rate was checked a first time in the period 
of October and November 2014 and a second time in the period of February and 
March 2015. Several controls were at play to spot inconsistencies in room 
availability, with the primary goal of detecting – and removing from the sample – 
Airbnb hosts whose listings were never available for booking. Out of the 1014 initial 
listings, these controls left the sample at 981 units. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the investigated sample. The average 
monthly revenue is around 1,500 Euros, with values ranging from 0 to more than 
10,000 Euros, thus presenting an intense dispersion. Around 15% of hosts have zero 
revenues. These performance data are in line with publicly available data from Airbnb 
(SmartAsset 2016).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
More than 70% of observations in the sample are entire flats, while the remaining 
ones are rooms in shared flats. The average listing comprises of 3.4 beds and 1.1 
bathrooms. It usually includes breakfast or kitchen facilities (89%) as well as internet 
connection and TV (77%). The presence of other attributes is less frequent. 
A key issue of the study is the measurement of the reputation variables, which are 
classified according to product and personal reputation, in line with the theoretical 
framework. Online reviews provide a first source of information for measuring the 
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reputation of the product. In particular, both the number (volume) of reviews and the 
average review score (valence) are observed. On one hand, the average review score 
is relatively high (4.68 out of 5) and its variability is low, given that negative reviews 
are seldom observed. On the other hand, the number of reviews shows a remarkable 
dispersion, ranging from 0 to 213. The absence of reviews affects around 18% of 
cases and conveys a problem of missing data concerning the review score. Deleting 
this observation would raise selection bias concerns. To avoid losing the informative 
value of these observations, we follow the approach suggested in Howell (2007), 
attributing the average review score of the other listings. In this regard, traditional 
criteria to deal with missing data (i.e., deleting observations, imputing median or 
mean) do not seem to hurt the accuracy of estimates, provided that datasets have up to 
20% of missing values (Acuna and Rodriguez 2004). In particular, the authors show 
that in the 15%-20% missing value range imputing the mean is the most accurate 
method. 
The presence of the flat’s professional photos is taken as a qualitative measure of 
product reputation and it is present in about half of the sample.  
As for the personal reputation indicators, three variables describe the profile 
characteristics. First, the number of days since registration (RHREG) measures the 
length of the host’s experience in the Airbnb platform. Second, a measure of profile 
completeness is operationalized as a dummy variable that takes value 1 only if the 
host has completed all the required information for full identification and includes a 
personal photo (RHID). Finally, the “Superhost” qualification is an institutional based 
mechanism certifying the reputation of the host when certain personal reputation 
requirements are satisfied. In detail, the Superhost qualification is given to those who 
have hosted at least 10 trips, maintained a 90% response rate or higher, had at least 
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half of his or her guests leave a review, received a 5-star review at least 80% of the 
time, and completed each of the confirmed reservations without cancelling. The 
requirements to get this institutional certification are quite demanding as less than 
10% of the hosts in the sample achieve such certification. The Superhost measure 
might raise concerns of multicollinearity with the other reputational variables. 
However, a Spearman correlation between Superhost and the other previously defined 
measures of reputation reaches a maximum value of 0.26, well below the 0.5-0.7 
threshold that signals potential multicollinearity problems (Dormann et al. 2012). 
More generally, including all the variables, VIFs were lower than 2.37, suggesting 
that multicollinearity does not affect the data. 
 
Research findings 
Equations [1] and [2] are estimated simultaneously. The empirical strategy was to 
estimate the stochastic frontier model with respect to (i) the entire sample of 981 
observations and (ii) the reduced sample of 824 observations showing positive (non-
zero) revenues. When using the entire sample, all revenue values were rescaled by 1 
to allow for logarithmic transformation. Working with the reduced sample strengthens 
the results because it removes those hosts who have zero revenues and thus, by 
construct, are inefficient.  
The stochastic frontier model exhibits a good fit, as shown in Table 2. The 
significance of both the parameters σu and σv confirms that the error term successfully 
splits according to inefficiency and random noise, with most of the variability due to 
inefficiency.  As expected, the part of variability due to inefficiency is much higher 
when working with the entire sample, while the value of λ (the ratio between σu and 
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σv) decreases from 8.24 to 5.78 in the reduced sample, given that the most inefficient 
units are removed. 
The coefficients in the upper part of Table 2 shape the revenue frontier, i.e. the 
maximum level of potential revenue. Interestingly, when comparing these coefficients 
for the two samples, they are all very stable, indicating that variables commanding 
potential revenues do not differ significantly. As expected, all city dummies are 
significant (AROME is omitted to avoid multicollinearity). The potential revenues 
generated by a similar listing in London (Paris) are 72% (58%) higher than in Rome, 
while, on the contrary, listings in Barcelona and Istanbul generate lower revenues 
with respect to Rome. Another key characteristic is given by the type of listing, with 
entire flats that can generate more than 30% additional revenues than rooms. The 
number of beds and bathrooms are both significant in determining the revenue 
frontier. The same is true for the presence of the Internet and TV, as well as the 
presence of washer and drier. The effect of other assets is not significant.  
Before moving to the bottom side of Table 2, it is useful to observe a plot of the 
predicted values of the model, in terms of revenue frontier and efficiency (Figure 2). 
For the sake of parsimony, the plot considers the reduced sample only. As shown, the 
achieved revenues are only a fraction of the potential revenues (left-hand side graph). 
This fraction is the measure of efficiency while, conversely, the distance to the 
potential revenues represents the inefficiency. The right-hand side graph in Figure 2 
shows that, while efficiency varies across observations, it is independent from the 
level of potential revenues. The efficiency is estimated via the Jondrow et al. (1982) 
formula, that is exp[-E(u|(v-u))]. On average, its level is around 0.40 in the entire 
sample and raises to 0.48 in the reduced sample, with a high dispersion among 
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observations. This suggests that only a small portion of hosts exploits the revenue 
potential of listings on Airbnb. 
The variability in host performances is explained by reputational attributes. The 
coefficients at the bottom of Table 2 inform on the determinants of the inefficiency. 
The two sets of estimates are consistent, though the magnitude of coefficients shrinks 
when working with the reduced sample. This is not surprising when recalling that the 
inefficiency is lower in the reduced sample compared with the entire one. Supporting 
the theoretical expectations (H1 and H2), both product and personal reputational 
variables show a significant negative effect on the inefficiency, with the unique 
exceptions represented by the review score (in both samples) and by the number of 
days since registration (in the entire sample only). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]  
 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
 
The list of coefficients presented in Table 2 ( 𝛿𝑘) does not directly represent the 
marginal effects of each reputational variable (Rk) on inefficiency. The latter are 
observation-specific and are computed as follows (Wang, 2002):  
𝜕𝐸(𝑢𝑖)
𝜕𝑅𝑘
= 𝛿𝑘 ∗ [1 − ⌈Λ
𝜙(Λ)
Φ(Λ)
⌉ − ⌈
𝜙(Λ)
Φ(Λ)
⌉
2
]                                                                        [3] 
where Λ =  μ𝑖/𝜎𝑖 (the ratio between the mean and the standard deviation of the 
inefficiency term); 𝜙 and Φ are the probability and cumulative density functions of a 
standard normal distribution, respectively. 
Table 3 reports the marginal effects and facilitates the comparison of the different 
reputational variables’ impact. For instance, by taking the estimates for the reduced 
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sample, 10 additional reviews (RPNUM) can reduce the inefficiency level by 0.06 
(0.006*10). A similar impact would be obtained for the length of registration on the 
platform (RHREG), if one considers a period of one year (0.0002*365 = 0.07). The 
comparison is even easier in the case of dummy variables, such as RPPHOTO, RHID, 
RHSH, whose marginal effects directly indicate the reduction of inefficiency that can 
be obtained by achieving that specific status. The Superhost qualification has the 
highest impact, reducing inefficiency, on average, by 0.44. 
A simulation can further shed light on the weight importance of reputational group 
factors in reducing hosts’ inefficiency and, in turn, increase their revenues. By using 
the marginal effects presented in Table 3, it is possible to measure the overall impact 
of an improvement in the various reputation indicators, classified according to the 
product and personal reputation groups of variables. In the simulated case, all the 
dummies are set to be equal to 1. Moreover, continuous variables are set at their mean 
values 3. This implies that when the current value is lower, each listing achieves at 
least 20 reviews and the number of days from registration is at least 620. Figure 3a 
and 3b present the findings, splitting the theoretical potential frontier (100% of 
efficiency) in 4 parts: (i) the current level of efficiency, (ii) the amount of efficiency 
that would be recovered by improving product reputation, (iii) the amount of 
efficiency that would be recovered by improving personal reputation, and (iv) the 
amount of residual inefficiency. Overall, the impact of personal reputation (black 
area) stands out with respect to product reputation (white area), giving support to H3. 
This result is consistent in the two samples and across the five cities. In particular, 
both in Figure 3a and 3b, the city of Istanbul presents the lowest average efficiency 
and the highest impact of reputation, the latter being even more salient than in the rest 
of the cities. 
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[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3a and 3b HERE] 
 
Finally, Table 4 shows some specification tests that provide support to the model 
proposed in this paper, a Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) with the reputational 
variables that explain the gap between potential and achieved revenues (inefficiency). 
In particular, the AIC and BIC scores, respectively Akaike's Information Criterion 
and Bayesian Information Criterion, indicate the appropriateness of the model when 
compared to both a naïve OLS model and an alternative SFA specification where  
reputation also explains the potential revenues rather than the inefficiency.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
The information criteria scores’ differences indicate a strong preference for the 
selected model, providing a further empirical support to our conceptual framework. 
 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
Since risk cannot be completely eliminated in online sharing economy platforms, it is 
important to provide mechanisms to reduce the uncertainty of transactions. This 
research uncloses the role of these mechanisms and bridges the gap between two 
salient aspects of the sharing economy, product and personal reputation. 
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The theoretical framework, based on the resource-based view of the firm (Dutt et al. 
1999; Nath et al. 2010), suggests that consumers consider both the product and the 
personal reputation of the seller during the purchase process. Although expecting an 
effect of product reputation on revenues is quite obvious, consumer responsiveness to 
personal reputation, especially when jointly addressed with product reputation, had 
yet to be assessed.  
Under the assumption that reputation is the key marketing capability that explains 
why subjects sharing similar goods on a platform might achieve a different 
performance, a stochastic frontier approach methodologically models the revenues for 
the sharing economy realm. The unique primary data collection through Airbnb 
captures variations across locations and measures the revenue impact for a reasonable 
time span. The findings, obtained from the empirical validation of the proposed model 
to the Airbnb sharing platform, suggest that, while shared assets help revenue 
generation (i.e., increase the frontier level), both product and personal reputation 
reduce the inefficiency level, supporting H1 and H2. Interestingly, the level of 
inefficiency is more than 50% in terms of the maximum possible achievable revenue, 
and this percentage is independent from the value of the listing in the sharing 
economy platform. The analysis of the marginal effects facilitates the comparison of 
the impact of the reputational variables. Among these variables, the role of personal 
reputation is noteworthy. More specifically, three forms of personal reputation are 
decisive in reducing revenue inefficiency: the identification of the seller, being a 
“Superhost”, and the date since the seller is present in the platform, with the latter 
being sensitive to the used sample. Among the product reputation variables, the 
number of reviews and the presence of professional pictures appear as significant but 
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their relative contribution to efficiency improvement is low. Overall, these results 
support H3. 
In terms of theoretical knowledge, the paper transposes the resource-based view 
approach to the firm (Dutta et al. 1999; Nath et al. 2010) to the sharing economy 
environment, by specifically unpacking the role of marketing capabilities. In this 
sense, the predominant role of personal reputation enforces the importance of 
personal branding strategies in sharing economy platforms (Tussyadiah 2016b). The 
picture is more puzzled for what concerns product reputation. Contrarily to previous 
research (Floyd et al. 2014; Liu 2006), the role of review valance on revenues appears 
to be negligible. This might be simply due to the presence of extremely high ratings 
with poor dispersion, making this variable of poor informative value. Paradoxically, 
while consumers concur that negative reviews are very helpful in evaluating services 
(Labrecque et al. 2013), people show a tendency to provide exceptionally high review 
scores to sellers, a phenomenon that is also documented in other P2P market places 
such as Ebay (Bolton et al. 2013). At the time of our empirical analysis, Airbnb used 
mutual review mechanisms and was exposed to a potential retaliation bias. However, 
Airbnb has recently changed its review policy to eliminate the risk of retaliation. It 
would be interesting to assess in future studies if the right-skewed review scores 
phenomenon holds after the introduction of this new policy and if it affects the way 
consumers process this information. The possible persistence of the phenomenon 
might also be explained by how subjects elaborate their experiences in sharing 
markets with respect to traditional markets. Specifically, what distinguishes sharing 
economy markets from more traditional markets is the personal contact experience 
(Guttentag et al. 2017). Therefore, consumers may show a more understanding 
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attitude towards service failure, e.g., showing non-complaining behavior, if they have 
created a personal connection with the service provider.  
This work is not without limitations. The first relates to the dataset. Despite several 
controls to retrieve accurate occupancy data, some listings were blocked part of the 
time and, in this specific case, it was not possible to isolate blocked from booked 
dates. This issue can now be overcome in future studies through the use of accurate 
booking data, as offered by the AirDNA platform. On this aspect, it is worth 
mentioning that hosts can still rent listings outside the official website, especially for 
returning customers (Forbes 2010). Second, although previous literature has already 
shown a strong link between reputation and trust (Belk 2014; Agag and El-Masry; 
2016; Ert et al. 2016), this research does not investigate directly how product and 
personal reputation affect consumers’ trust. Third, although mean imputation provides 
generally robust estimates especially for datasets having between 15% and 20% of 
missing values (Acuna and Rodriguez 2004), replacing the missing average review 
scores with a single value will deflate the variance and partially impact on the 
distribution of that variable. 
Finally, it remains to be investigated whether these results are fully transferable to 
P2P platforms offering search and utilitarian goods. In fact, the relative importance 
weights of product and personal reputation on revenues might change considering the 
reduced levels of personal risks associated to these other platforms (Schiffman and 
Kanuk 2000). 
To boost their personal reputation, various practical means can be employed by online 
sellers in sharing economy platforms. Airbnb is already piloting a platform where the 
seller can present a video with its own storytelling (Airbnb, 2017). Creating a virtual 
attachment to potential buyers can in fact favor a relationship connection with the host 
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before the actual experience (Pera and Viglia 2016). In this setting, sharing economy 
platforms have to act as a tertius iungens, benefiting from the increased reputation of 
its sellers.  
In conclusion, platform managers can influence the effectiveness of reputation by: i) 
encouraging hosts to provide more information about themselves to favor full 
transparency and reduce the uncertainty in the purchase process; ii) facilitating 
independent institutional mechanisms (Chang et al. 2013) by providing incentives 
such as a commission reduction; iii) favoring the market penetration with the goal of 
increasing the number and the accuracy of reviews and iv) enhancing qualitative 
attributes, such as the presence of professional photos.  
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Figure 1. Theoretical framework of the study 
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Figure 2. Representation of stochastic frontier estimates. 
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Figure 3a and 3b. Impact of product and personal reputation on efficiency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
100.0%
Residual inefficiency
Host's reputational
impact
Product's
reputational impact
Average Efficiency
Entire sample (n= 981)
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
100.0%
Residual inefficiency
Host's reputational
impact
Product's
reputational impact
Average Efficiency
Reduced sample (n= 824)
 37 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Type Variable Variable description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable REV Monthly revenues (€) 1287 1525 0 10944 
Flat/room 
characteristics 
(Shared Assets, A) 
ABAR Located in Barcelona 19.57% 
   
AIST Located in Istanbul 20.79% 
   
ALON Located in London 19.37% 
   
APAR Located in Paris 20.29% 
   
AROME Located in Rome 19.98% 
   
ATYPE Entire flat 71.15%    
ABED Number of beds 3.44 1.53 1 10 
ABATH Number of bathrooms 1.13 0.46 0 5 
ACOOK 
Kitchen or Breakfast 
included 
89.20% 
   
AIT Internet and Tv 77.06% 
   
AWASH Washer and Drier 27.52% 
   
ASAFETY Safety device 25.89% 
   
ATOI Guest toiletries 32.52% 
   
ALUX 
Swimming pool or 
Gym or Jacuzzi 
18.86% 
   
Reputation of the 
product (RP) 
RPNUM Number of reviews 19.80 28.11 0 213 
RPSCORE Average review score 4.68 0.25 2.75 5 
RPPHOTO Professional photo 44.24% 
   
Reputation of the 
host (RH) 
RHREG 
Registered from 
(number of days) 
620 431 37 4577 
RHID Full identification 35.88% 
   
RHSH Super-host 9.48% 
   
In the case of dummy variables (taking value 1 if the service or characteristic is present and value 0 if it is not), we only 
present the average value, which corresponds to the percentage of listings in the sample holding that specific 
characteristic. 
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Table 2. Results 
 
 
 Entire sample Reduced sample 
Stochastic frontier model N. observations 981 N. observations 824 
 Wald Chi-square 630.45 (p=0.000) Wald Chi-square 685.71 (p=0.000) 
 Log-likelihood -1478.62 Log-likelihood -984.79 
 AIC 3003.2 AIC 2015.6 
 BIC 3115.7 BIC 2124.0 
Frontier model 
Dependent variable is lnREV     
Variables Coefficients (std. errors) Coefficients (std. errors) 
ABAR -0.309 (0.080)*** -0.317 (0.075)*** 
AIST -0.861 (0.105)*** -0.661 (0.095)*** 
ALON 0.723 (0.073)*** 0.731 (0.069)*** 
APAR 0.577 (0.072)*** 0.576 (0.067)*** 
ATYPE 0.373 (0.069)*** 0.316 (0.066)*** 
ABED 0.112 (0.020)*** 0.114 (0.019)*** 
ABATH 0.200 (0.063)*** 0.170 (0.059)*** 
ACOOK -0.049 (0.089) -0.053 (0.085) 
AIT 0.136 (0.062)** 0.108 (0.059)* 
AWASH 0.237 (0.058)*** 0.226 (0.054)*** 
ASAFETY 0.019 (0.057) 0.028 (0.054) 
ATOI -0.072 (0.053) -0.082 (0.050) 
ALUX -0.052 (0.064) -0.048 (0.060) 
Constant 6.983 (0.133)*** 7.002 (0.130)*** 
Model of inefficiency                         𝜹𝒌                         𝜹𝒌 
 RPNUM -0.191 (0.045)*** -0.033 (0.014)** 
RPSCORE -0.117 (0.910) 0.129 (0.230) 
RPPHOTO -2.436 (0.720)*** -0.903 (0.450)** 
RHREG -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000)** 
RHID -3.071 (0.780)*** -1.389 (0.536)*** 
RHSH -7.206 (2.441)*** -2.409 (1.085)** 
Constant 1.631 (4.251) -0.477 (1.235) 
σu 3.075 (0.325)*** 1.968 (0.306)*** 
σv 0.373 (0.033)*** 0.341 (0.029)*** 
λ = σu /σv 8.237 (0.328)*** 5.778 (0.302)*** 
Average efficiency 0.408  0.484  
*** p-value <0.01, ** p-value <0.05, * p-value <0.10 
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Table 3. Marginal effects of reputation on inefficiency 
 Only Active Airbnb Entire Sample 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
RPNUM -0.006 0.003 -0.012 -0.001 -0.036 0.026 -0.084 -0.001 
RPSCORE 0.024 0.010 0.003 0.047 -0.022 0.015 -0.051 -0.000 
RPPHOTO -0.164 0.070 -0.330 -0.021 -0.461 0.327 -1.081 -0.010 
RHREG -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0000 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.000 
RHID -0.253 0.107 -0.507 -0.033 -0.581 0.412 -1.364 -0.013 
RHSH -0.439 0.186 -0.880 -0.058 -1.363 0.967 -3.200 -0.030 
Marginal effects describe the impact of each variable on the average inefficiency, E(u), through the Wang (2002) 
method.  
Since inefficiency is half-normally distributed and can range from 0 to +∞, the value of marginal effects cannot be 
interpreted in terms of percentage impact. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Specification tests 
 
Entire sample 
(N. observations = 981) 
Reduced sample 
(N. observations = 824) 
SFA, reputation explains inefficiency 
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐴𝑖) + 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 
𝑢𝑖~𝑁
+(𝜇𝑖 , 𝜎𝑖
2); 𝑣𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2); 𝜇𝑖 = 𝑔(𝑅𝑖) 
AIC  = 3003,2; BIC = 3115,7 AIC = 2015,6; BIC = 2124,0 
Alternative 1: OLS 
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐴𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖) + 𝑣𝑖  
𝑣𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) 
AIC = 3380,1; BIC = 3447,9 AIC = 2175,0; BIC = 2269,3 
Alternative 2: SFA, reputation explains frontier 
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐴𝑖, 𝑅𝑖) + 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 
𝑢𝑖~𝑁
+(𝜇𝑖 , 𝜎𝑖
2); 𝑣𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) 
AIC = 3222,3; BIC = 3334,7 AIC = 2043,0; BIC = 2151,5 
 The lowest values of AIC and BIC indicate the best specification.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Notes 
 
1 The selected attractions are the following: Sagrada Familia (Barcelona), Hagia Sofia 
(Istanbul), London Eye (London), Eiffel Tower (Paris) and Colosseum (Rome). 
 
2 In particular, the availability of a listing in date t was collected from the day t+1 to 
the day t+28, while all the other information presented in Table 1 refers to date t. 
 
3 A sensitivity analysis available upon request shows that the results do not change 
significantly using the 25th, 50th (median) or the 75th percentile. 
 
 
